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Abstract:  According  to  many  philosophers,  the  world  should  embrace  open  borders  –  that  is,  let  
people  move  around  the  globe  and  settle  as  they  wish,  with  exceptions  made  only  in  very  
specific  cases  such  as  fugitives  or  terrorists.  Defenders  of  open  borders  have  adopted  two  
major  argumentative  strategies.  The  first  is  to  claim  that  immigration  restrictions  involve  
coercion,  and  then  show  that  such  coercion  cannot  be  morally  justified.  The  second  is  to  argue  
that  adopting  worldwide  open  borders  policies  would  make  the  world  a  much  better  place,  
particularly  by  improving  average  well-­being.  This  essay  contends  that  both  of  these  
argumentative  strategies  fail.  Some  immigration  restrictions  are  not  only  morally  justified,  but  
morally  required.  
                 
1  The  Coercion  Based  Argument  
                 
Many  philosophers  think  that  immigration  restrictions  involve  coercion.  That  is,  controlling  the  
movement  of  people  across  national  borders  involves  making  people  do  what  they  don’t  want  to  
do  –  namely,  stay  where  they  are  geographically  –  by  threat  of  force.  Where  the  state  shares  a  
land  border  with  a  source  of  potential  immigrants,  it  may  use  border  guards  to  deter  or  forcibly  
repel  potential  immigrants  who  lack  the  needed  documents.  When  it  comes  to  airports,  it  is  
typically  not  possible  to  board  a  plane  headed  to  a  country  without  the  required  documentation  –  
any  attempts  to  do  so  are  typically  met  with  expulsion  by  security  guards.  Furthermore,  if  any  
such  attempts  succeed,  and  a  potential  immigrant  reaches  an  airport  located  in  the  said  country,  
he  will  usually  be  repatriated  unless  he  can  claim  asylum  or  some  other  legal  status.1  
                 
Some  philosophers  see  this  coercion  as  being  deeply  problematic.  What  gives  states  the  right  to  
coerce  foreigners  in  this  way?  The  question  here  is  not  merely  about  states  having  the  right  to  
exclusive  legal  power  over  a  territory.  For  even  if  you  think  that  states  have  the  right  to  be  the  
sole  lawmakers  and  enforcers  on  a  piece  of  land,  it  still  doesn’t  follow  that  this  gives  them  the  
right  to  exclude  foreigners  from  entering  and  settling  on  that  land.  Indeed,  there  are  many  things  
states  may  not  do  even  if  they  are  the  sole  arbiters  of  justice  –  they  may  not  arbitrarily  arrest,  
torture,  or  kill  their  citizens,  for  example.  Likewise,  is  coercively  preventing  foreigners  from  
settling  on  the  territory  over  which  a  state  has  dominion  something  a  state  may  not  do?  
                 
A  major  theme  in  the  recent  literature  making  such  a  case  is  that  we  should  think  of  non-­
coercion  as  the  moral  default  –  and  thus  state  coercion  always  stands  in  need  of  justification.  In  
other  words,  the  state  shouldn’t  force  people  to  behave  in  particular  ways  unless  there  are  
strong  reasons  for  interfering  with  people’s  freedom.  Different  writers  then  go  on  to  make  
substantive  cases  for  why  such  coercion  is  not  ultimately  justified.2  
                 
In  what  follows,  I  consider  a  variety  of  purposes  for  which  it’s  plausible  that  state  coercion  is  
justified.  I  then  argue  that  if  such  state  coercion  is  justified,  then  the  coercion  involved  in  certain  
immigration  restrictions  is  justified  as  well.  The  reader,  in  the  end,  might  of  course  deny  that  
state  coercion  is  justified  in  the  examples  I  point  to  below  –  but  then  she  is  committed  to  a  
radical  rethinking  of  much  of  our  current  policies  on  a  host  of  issues.  So  if  you  think  immigration  
restrictions  are  unjustified  because  they  are  coercive,  you  will  be  committed  to  thinking  there  
should  be  drastically  less  state  intervention  in  a  host  of  other  domains.  
                 
Even  the  most  liberal  modern  states  coerce  us  in  many  ways.  The  main  way  they  do  so  is  by  
stopping  us  from,  or  punishing  us  for,  directly  infringing  on  the  (negative)  rights  of  others.  If  you  
assault  someone,  the  state  puts  you  in  jail,  for  example.  But  there  are  many  other  purposes  for  
which  coercion  is  used.  For  instance,  whether  justified  or  not,  taxation  is  coercion.  You  don’t  
have  the  option  as  to  whether  to  pay  your  taxes.  The  state  uses  threats  of  force,  including  jail-­
time,  to  make  sure  people  pay  what  taxes  it  assigns  to  them.  
                 
Coercion  is  also  often  used  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  interests  of  the  domestic  population  
with  low  socioeconomic  status.  Consider  for  example,  minimum  wage  regulations.  Such  
regulations  are  coercive  –  if  A  is  willing  to  pay  B  $X/hour  and  no  more,  and  B  desires  to  accept  
this  offer,  the  state  forbids  this  transaction  with  threat  of  force  if  X  is  lower  than  the  minimum  
wage  set  by  law.  Furthermore,  there  can  arise  cases  where  high  enough  minimum  wages  are  
compatible  with  low  unemployment  only  in  the  presence  of  trade  restrictions,  another  form  of  
coercion,  so  that  cheap  goods  cannot  be  imported  from  elsewhere.  While  experts  may  debate  
the  desirability  of  such  policies,  most  seem  to  think  that  the  state  is  at  least  within  its  rights  to  
enact  them.  
                 
Coercive  laws  are  also  employed  to  protect  things  we  deem  valuable  in  and  of  themselves.  
States  seem  to  be  within  their  rights  to  prohibit  certain  activities  with  respect  to  national  parks  
containing  valuable  ecosystems  –  most  people  think  it’s  fine  for  the  state  to  forbid  logging  or  
hunting  within  such  parks,  for  example.  
                 
Lastly,  coercion  is  also  legitimately  used  to  prevent  what  economists  call  negative  externalities.  
Consider  the  case  of  a  cheap  battery  manufacturer.  The  manufacturer  and  consumers  both  
benefit  from  his  being  able  to  use  cheap  toxic  chemicals  in  the  process  and  dumping  them  in  
the  nearby  river.  But  the  state  may  legitimately  prevent  this  mutually  beneficial  transaction,  
because  the  costs  involved  are  not  entirely  internalized  by  the  parties.  
                 
It  thus  seems  that  most  people  are  committed  to  the  view  that  states  may  legitimately  use  
coercion  to  prevent  negative  externalities,  promote  the  interests  of  their  low  socioeconomic  
status  residents,  and  protect  the  existence  of  valuable  things.  If  this  is  right,  then  there  arises  
the  possibility  that  the  coercion  involved  in  immigration  restrictions  is  justified  for  these  reasons,  
depending  on  what  the  empirical  facts  look  like.  
                 
Let’s  take  the  case  of  negative  externalities  first.  Whether  or  not,  and  to  what  extent,  a  particular  
immigration  policy  creates  negative  externalities  on  the  existing  population  of  a  country  is  an  
empirical  question,  the  answer  to  which  cannot  be  determined  from  the  armchair.  It  also  
plausibly  can  vary  greatly  based  on  the  specifics  of  the  immigration  policy  –  most  importantly,  
the  characteristics  and  numbers  of  the  immigrants  admitted.  
                 
The  recent  immigration  policies  of  Sweden  and  Germany,  for  example,  which  have  ostensibly  
focused  on  helping  large  numbers  of  asylum  seekers  (though  what  percentage  have  actually  
been  economic  migrants  is  a  topic  of  controversy),  have  arguably  involved  significant  negative  
externalities  though  they  have  no  doubt  benefited  the  asylum  seekers  themselves.  Tino  
Sanandaji,  an  economist  at  the  Stockholm  School  of  Economics,  has  documented  in  detail  the  
sorts  of  problems  that  Sweden’s  policy  in  particular  has  invited.  Among  the  most  striking  facts  is  
that  while  foreign-­born  people  compose  17%  of  the  Swedish  population,  they  receive  60%  of  the  
welfare  expenditures.  76%  of  members  of  criminal  gangs  have  immigrant  backgrounds.  A  
recent  government  commissioned  study  from  the  Zurich  University  of  Applied  Sciences  has  
noted  a  surge  in  crime  following  Angela  Merkel’s  decision  in  2015  to  open  doors  to  a  large  
number  of  asylum  seekers.  For  example,  in  Lower  Saxony,  violent  crime  had  decreased  
between  2007  and  2014,  but  was  up  by  10.4%  by  the  end  of  2016.  92.1%  of  the  increase,  
among  the  solved  cases,  is  attributable  to  newcomers.  And  while  most  of  the  murder  victims  
were  migrants  themselves,  70%  of  robberies  and  58.6%  of  sexual  assault  cases  had  German  
victims.  A  different  report,  released  by  the  German  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  found  that  the  rate  of  
violent  crime  in  general  and  for  sexual  assault  and  rape  is  about  5  times  higher  among  
foreigners  as  compared  to  native  Germans,  and  about  15  times  higher  among  asylum  seekers.3  
                 
Given  these  negative  economic  and  social  externalities,  it  is  plausible  to  argue  that  border  
coercion  is  justified.  Moreover,  these  unpleasant  facts  demonstrate  that  immigration  decisions,  
even  if  they  are  beneficial  to  parties  who  want  to  associate  with  potential  immigrants  such  as  
family  members  and  employers,  may  not  always  be  a  net  positive  for  the  welfare  of  the  rest  of  a  
country’s  residents.  
                 
Consider  now  the  second  point,  namely  that  coercion  is  justified  in  protecting  the  interests  of  a  
country’s  less  well  off.  One  foreseeable  impact  of  having  fully  open  borders  is  that  it  will  drive  
wages  down  for  less  skilled  workers.  This  is  just  a  function  of  supply  and  demand  –  a  large  
influx  of  less  skilled  workers  from  poor  but  populous  countries  will  increase  the  number  of  
people  willing  and  able  to  do  retail,  agricultural,  and  fast  food  jobs,  for  example.  This  will  push  
the  wages  down  for  this  type  of  work,  thus  adversely  affecting  the  well  being  of  less  skilled  
workers  already  in  the  country.4  For  this  reason,  some  progressive  philosophers  who  think  we  
have  weighty  special  obligations  to  the  domestic  needy  oppose  open  borders.5  Of  course,  
libertarians  may  not  be  convinced  by  this  reasoning.  Hence  let  me  pose  this  as  an  if-­then  claim:  
if  you  think  that  we  have  special  obligations  to  the  domestic  needy  that  justify  coercion,  then  you  
should  be  wary  of  open  borders  proposals.  Notice  how  radical  denying  such  special  obligations  
is,  however.  It  would  mean  either  that  redistributive  taxation  is  simply  unjustified,  or  that  rich  
countries  should  spend  virtually  nothing  on  their  domestic  needy,  sending  much  of  their  tax  
collections  abroad,  since  each  dollar,  euro,  or  yen  goes  much  further  in  Bangladesh  or  Kenya.  
                 
Lastly,  as  is  evident  in  the  case  of  national  parks,  coercion  seems  to  be  justified  in  preventing  
the  destruction  of  something  of  value.  Now,  presumably  liberal,  high-­trust  societies  are  
intrinsically  valuable.  Such  societies  embody  valuable  relationships  among  their  residents,  
which  are  valuable  in  a  way  akin  to  the  way  that  friendships  are  valuable.  Liberal  societies  are  
also  uniquely  suited  to  human  flourishing,  for  individuals  there  have  the  relatively  robust  ability  
to  speak  their  minds,  explore  new  ideas,  create  challenging  writing  and  art,  and  so  on.  
                 
If  liberal  societies  are  valuable  in  roughly  these  ways,  and  if  having  a  regime  of  open  borders  
would  put  the  existence  of  such  societies  at  risk,  then  there  may  be  a  further  justification  for  
border  coercion.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to  think  such  a  risk  is  substantial.  Societies  around  the  
world  differ  not  only  with  respect  to  superficial  customs  of  dress  and  cuisine,  but  also  with  
deeply  held  moral  beliefs  and  social  norms.  Furthermore,  some  very  populous  countries  have  
norms  that  are  by  any  standard  in  tension  with  the  norms  of  liberal  society.  
  
Consider  the  case  of  just  one  such  country  –  Pakistan.  A  PEW  Research  survey  published  in  
2013  found  that  the  majority  of  people  in  the  country  believed  that  women  should  not  have  the  
choice  as  to  whether  to  veil,  that  wives  should  always  obey  their  husbands,  that  the  death  
penalty  is  appropriate  for  apostasy,  and  that  adulterers  ought  to  be  stoned.6  Now,  Pakistan  has  
a  population  in  excess  of  200  million.  Suppose  Denmark,  a  broadly  liberal  society  with  a  
population  of  less  than  6  million,  is  deciding  whether  to  have  an  open  borders  regime  or  not.  It  
seems  reasonable  for  one  to  worry  whether  Denmark’s  liberal  norms  can  survive  a  large  
enough  movement  of  the  representative  citizen  of  Pakistan  into  its  territory.  
                 
The  issue  is  especially  challenging  given  the  fact  that  Denmark’s  per  capita  GDP  is  more  than  
10  times  as  large  as  that  of  Pakistan,  even  after  adjusting  for  purchasing  power.  Thus  if  
Denmark  were  to  announce  a  fully  open  borders  policy,  it’s  not  unreasonable  to  expect  many  
millions  to  move  to  the  country  seeking  out  better  economic  opportunities.7  And  if  large  enough  
numbers  of  people  move,  it’s  not  unreasonable  to  expect  that  many  of  their  social  norms  will  
remain  largely  intact.  People  don’t  change  overnight,  and  they  are  less  inclined  to  change  if  
surrounded  by  large  enough  numbers  of  like-­minded  people.  Of  course,  we  don’t  have  random  
controlled  experiments  involving  such  large  movements  between  such  diverse  countries  to  
make  a  definitive  call.  
                 
But  what  should  we  reasonably  expect  to  happen  if  a  representative  sample  of  20  million  people  
from  Pakistan  were  to  move  to  Denmark  over  the  course  of  less  than  5  years?  Plausibly,  
informal  social  norms  would  move  in  the  illiberal  direction.  The  problem  would  be  compounded  
by  the  eventual  granting  of  voting  rights  –  people  will  likely  vote  according  to  their  antecedently  
held  values,  and  it  would  not  be  unreasonable  to  expect  newly  elected  politicians  to  enact  
illiberal  laws.  Such  worries  would  be  partially  addressed  by  making  newcomers  ineligible  to  
vote,  perhaps  for  a  long  period  of  time.  But  whether  this  is  itself  consistent  with  liberalism  is  not  
obvious.  Moreover,  it’s  not  obvious  that  such  a  policy  would  be  feasible  –  disenfranchisement  of  
large  chunks  of  the  population  tends  to  invite  social  strife.  
                 
Now,  I  have  used  the  case  of  Denmark  and  Pakistan  to  illustrate  an  extreme  possibility.  In  
reality  there  are  several  more  roughly  liberal  societies  besides  Denmark,  which  are  also  more  
populous.  Nonetheless,  there  are  many  societies  that  adopt  illiberal  norms  on  the  whole  as  well,  
and  several  of  these  have  rapidly  growing  populations.  
                 
All  that  is  said  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  applies  of  course  to  open  borders  policies,  which  by  
definition  would  not  filter  potential  immigrants.  If  there  is  a  good  way  for  Denmark  to  filter  
immigrants  from  Pakistan,  perhaps  by  using  proxies  like  education,  so  that  the  representative  
immigrant  from  Pakistan  to  Denmark  is  not  likely  to  continue  to  embrace  the  significantly  illiberal  
norms  accepted  by  the  average  resident  of  Pakistan,  then  the  worries  above  will  not  apply  for  
those  immigrants.  Furthermore,  numbers  will  matter:  if  the  stream  of  migration  from  broadly  
illiberal  societies  to  broadly  liberal  ones  is  small  enough,  then  some  degree  of  assimilation  is  to  
be  expected,  depending  on  the  specific  context.  The  argument  thus  shouldn’t  be  taken  to  
suggest  that  Denmark  is  justified  in  admitting  zero  immigrants  from  Pakistan  for  this  reason.  
                 
One  way  to  resist  these  conclusions  is  to  say  that  coercion  is  sometimes  justified,  but  the  bar  for  
justification  is  very  high  –  high  enough  that  the  sorts  of  considerations  brought  up  earlier  don’t  
justify  border  coercion.  The  task  for  the  defender  of  this  position  is  to  explain  why  the  kinds  of  
coercion  that  occur  in  non-­immigration  contexts  –  taxation,  minimum  wages,  national  parks  –  
are  justified.  Of  course,  a  philosopher  arguing  from  anarcho-­libertarian  commitments  may  reject  
these  forms  of  coercion  as  well.  But  if  the  only  way  to  defend  open  borders  is  to  adopt  such  a  
radical  view  of  political  philosophy,  which  in  practice  has  very  few  adherents,  then  I  consider  the  
case  for  some  immigration  restrictions  to  stand  on  very  solid  ground.  
                 
2  Consequentialist  Arguments  
                 
The  preceding  section  considered  open  borders  arguments  that  take  deontological  form  –  they  
start  from  the  prima  facie  impermissibility  of  coercion,  and  argue  that  the  prima  facie  case  
withstands  scrutiny.  I  have  claimed  that  the  argument  doesn’t  withstand  scrutiny,  given  the  
empirical  facts,  and  given  the  permissibility  of  state  coercion  in  other  contexts.  
                 
A  separate  case  for  open  borders  can  be  made  on  consequentialist  grounds.  In  a  widely  cited  
paper,  economist  Michael  Clemens  argues  that  allowing  for  free  migration  would  likely  double  
world  GDP.  Doubling  world  GDP  would  mean  lifting  hundreds  of  millions  of  people  out  of  
poverty,  particularly  since  those  who  would  benefit  most  would  be  the  global  poor  who  would  be  
able  to  move  in  search  of  better  economic  opportunities.8  In  light  of  this  enormous  potential  
good,  it  seems  there  better  be  very  good  reasons  to  keep  immigration  restrictions  in  place.  And  
perhaps,  some  will  argue,  given  this  enormous  upside  the  sorts  of  considerations  marshaled  
earlier  are  not  adequate  to  justify  immigration  restrictions.  
  
In  what  follows,  I  will  tackle  the  consequentialist  argument  head-­on  by  challenging  the  claim  that  
in  the  long  run  the  world  would  be  a  better  place  if  open  borders  were  instituted  as  a  general  
rule.  But  before  doing  so,  I  will  sketch  the  models  and  assumptions  economists  use  when  they  
make  claims  about  dramatic  potential  increases  in  world  GDP.  I  will  then  argue  that  such  
reasoning  ignores  worries  about  the  potential  long  term  effects  of  migration.  
                 
Economists  arguing  for  open  borders  start  by  observing  that  workers  in  different  countries  have  
vastly  different  productivity.  Workers  in  the  developed  world  are  much  more  productive  than  
workers  in  the  developing  world,  even  when  controlling  for  the  level  of  skill.  Hence,  someone  
moving  from  a  poor  enough  country  to  the  U.S.  will  likely  experience  a  massive  increase  in  
productivity  as  well  as  wages.  This  observation  is  hard  to  dispute  and  is  borne  out  by  standard  
economic  theory  and  available  data.9  The  explanations  for  this  change  in  productivity  appeal  to  
things  like  the  infrastructure  and  amount  of  capital  available  in  the  U.S.,  which  in  turn  are  
maintained  by  its  relatively  good  economic  institutions.  
                 
But  if  this  is  right,  then  isn’t  allowing  for  free  movement  a  way  to  massively  increase  world  GDP  
and  living  standards  for  the  global  poor?  How  productive  you  are  depends  not  only  on  you,  but  
on  the  institutional  context  you  find  yourself  in.  Some  countries  have  better  economic  and  
political  institutions  than  others.  So,  instead  of  keeping  some  people  stuck  with  bad  institutions  
where  they’re  less  productive,  shouldn’t  we  move  them  to  places  with  better  institutions?  Even  if  
there  are  some  net  losers  overall  (for  example  the  poor  in  the  developed  countries),  this  seems  
to  be  a  way  to  promote  great  good  for  the  majority  of  the  world  population.  The  core  proposal  
behind  consequentialist  open  border  thinking  can  be  summed  up  thus:  let’s  move  people  from  
places  with  bad  institutions  to  places  with  good  institutions.  In  so  doing,  we’ll  be  helping  the  
global  poor  help  themselves,  as  well  as  most  of  the  rest  of  us,  given  increases  in  worldwide  
productivity.  Hence,  the  average  person  will  be  much  better  off  with  open-­borders.  
                 
The  problem  with  this  reasoning  is  that  it  makes  a  crucial  unfounded  assumption:  that  the  
different  sorts  of  institutions  we  see  in  different  countries  are  fixed.  But  what  if,  as  a  result  of  
large  migrations,  the  institutions  of  the  receiving  countries  themselves  change?  And  what  if  they  
change  for  the  worse  in  the  long  run?  This  possibility  throws  a  huge  wrench  in  the  model.  If  we  
don’t  assume  institutions  are  fixed,  all  bets  are  off  –  it  may  well  even  turn  out  that  in  the  long  
run,  open  borders  will  result  in  aggregate  world  GDP  being  lower  than  it  would  otherwise  been  
with  some  restrictions  in  place.  
                 
The  worry  that  a  country’s  institutions  will  change  in  the  long  run,  depending  on   the  numbers  
and  average  characteristics  of  the  immigrants  it  accepts,  is  not  unfounded  and  there  is  mounting  
evidence  to  the  effect.  For  one,  new  voters  mean  new  policies,  and  new  policies  can  affect  long  
run  productivity.10  Second,  informal  institutions  and  family  relationships  can  travel  with  people  
as  they  move,  and  such  institutions  are  important  for  economic  performance.11  In  addition,  
trusting  behavior  among  immigrants  and  its  transmission  to  younger  generations  can  depend  
significantly  on  the  country  of  origin.12  Importantly,  trusting  behavior  affects  economic  growth  –  
high  trust  societies  are  able  to  grow  faster  and  maintain  higher  levels  of  prosperity.  Recent  work  
in  economics  and  behavioral  science  has  also  found  that  corruption  tends  to  travel  with  people  
as  they  relocate.13  A  new  paper  by  economist  Eugen  Dimant  and  colleagues  estimates  that  
immigration  from  highly  corrupt  countries  to  the  OECD  (Organization  for  Economic  Co-­operation  
and  Development,  a  group  of  35  fairly  developed  countries)  dramatically  raises  corruption  in  
host  countries.  Their  models  indicate  a  rise  of  almost  1  point  out  of  7,  for  every  100  immigrants  
from  highly  corrupt  countries  per  1000  citizens.  A  striking  result  is  that  regardless  of  the  
econometric  methodology  they  applied,  the  researchers  found  that  movement  of  people  from  
high-­corruption  countries  boosts  corruption  in  the  host  country.  This  is  very  important  to  keep  in  
mind  because  some  of  the  world’s  poorest  countries,  and  hence  those  which  will  experience  the  
greatest  emigrations  in  an  open  borders  regime,  are  also  among  the  most  corrupt.14,15  Lastly,  in  
a  paper  for  the  for  the  prestigious  Journal  of  Economic  Literature,  economists  Enrico  Spolaore  
and  Romain  Wacziarg  provide  strong  reasons  to  think  that  prosperity  has  “deep  roots.”  They  
write  that  a  growing  body  of  evidence  in  the  economic  development  and  history  literature  
“suggests  that  economic  development  is  affected  by  traits  that  have  been  transmitted  across  
generations  over  the  very  long  run.”16  
                 
A  key  finding  in  this  literature  is  that  a  country’s  migration-­adjusted  quality  of  institutions  at  1500  
AD  strongly  predicts  the  quality  of  current  institutions  and  GDP  per  capita.  That  is,  if  you  look  at  
institutional  quality  of  various  places  in  1500  AD,  and  then  take  into  account  where  people  
moved  since  then,  you  can  predict  with  fairly  good  accuracy  the  institutional  quality  of  a  country  
today.  Economist  James  Ang  writes  “These  findings  suggest  that  a  country  that  has  more  
ancestors  who  lived  in  prosperous  places  tends  to  have  better  institutions  today.”17  People,  it  
seems,  have  tended  to  carry  their  institutions  with  them.  And  if  they  have  generally  done  so  in  
the  past,  what  reason  is  there  to  think  current  movements  will  prove  an  exception  to  this  
centuries-­long  pattern?  
                 
What  these  emerging  literatures  point  to  is  that  assuming  a  country’s  institutions  will  remain  
fixed  in  the  long  run  in  the  presence  of  open  borders  is  a  huge  mistake.  A  polity’s  institutions  
don’t  fall  down  from  heaven;;  they  are  a  function  of  the  residents  and  voters  of  the  polity.  So  
where  does  this  leave  us  in  the  consequentialist  calculus?  Plausibly,  it  means  we  should  be  
extremely  wary  of  open  borders.  The  main  reason  is  that  even  if  you’re  a  utilitarian  –  so  that  you  
care  about  total  well-­being  around  the  world  rather  than  in  a  specific  country  or  set  of  countries  
–  you  want  there  to  be  some  countries  with  relatively  good  institutions.  For,  these  are  the  
countries  which  generate  much  of  the  important  scientific  and  technological  innovations  that  
enormously  benefit  the  global  poor.  Just  think  of  how  much  the  global  poor  have  benefited  from  
antibiotics,  the  polio  vaccine,  light  bulbs,  fertilizers,  cell  phones,  and  so  on  –  all  of  which  have  
been  invented  in  the  developed  world,  thanks  to  its  good  institutions.  Reducing  the  quality  of  
developed  world  institutions  through  open  borders  may  be  good,  in  the  long  run,  for  neither  the  
host  nations  nor  the  global  poor  themselves.18  
                 
3  Conclusion  
                 
If  you  are  convinced  by  the  arguments  of  this  paper,  what  kinds  of  immigration  restrictions  
should  you  support?  Would  it  be  desirable  or  justifiable  for  developed  countries  to  have  a  policy  
of  admitting  zero  immigrants  from  poorer  countries?  I  do  not  think  so.  Rather,  what  the  
arguments  of  this  essay  point  towards  is  a  policy  of  filtered  restriction.  Developed  countries  
should  find  a  way  of  creating  filtering  mechanisms  when  admitting  citizens  from  countries  with  
corrupt  institutions  or  illiberal  norms.  They  should  find  a  way  to  admit  as  many  immigrants  as  
possible  in  a  way  that  doesn’t  threaten  the  quality  of  their  institutions  in  the  long  run  and  doesn’t  
impose  significant  negative  externalities  on  their  citizens.  After  all,  I  have  not  denied  that  
immigration  restrictions  involve  coercion  and  that  coercion  should  be  avoided  as  a  moral  
default.  Moreover,  freer  immigration  regulations  with  appropriate  filtering  mechanisms  may  
indeed  make  the  world  a  much  better  place.  
                 
What  an  adequate  filtering  mechanism  will  ultimately  look  like  is  an  empirical  question.  
Determining  what  the  relevant  and  best  available  proxies  are  will  require  detailed  social  
scientific  research.  If  it  turns  out  that  highly  educated  immigrants  are  more  likely  to  adopt  liberal  
norms  and  less  likely  to  increase  the  host  country’s  corruption  levels,  for  example,  that’s  a  
reason  to  prefer  highly  educated  immigrants,  unless  a  better  proxy  can  be  found.  Importantly,  a  
just  policy  will  involve  making  distinctions  between  different  kinds  of  immigration,  rather  than  
treating  it  as  an  all  or  nothing  issue.  In  the  end,  it  will  likely  turn  out  that  some  kinds  of  
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